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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
HOWARD E. W ATICINS, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
YS. 
UTAH POULTRY AND FARMERS 
COOPERATIVE, a corporation, 




NATURE OF CASE 
This suit was brought by the appellant Howard E. 
Watkins against respondent Utah Poultry and Farmers 
Cooperative, a corporation, to recover damages for 
personal injuries consisting primarily of the loss of an 
arm and a leg and brain concussion in a sideswiping 
truck accident which occurred at a narrow bridge near the 
Lunt Roadside Park on the Buckhorn Flat, in Iron 
County, Utah about 7 miles north of Paragonah (Exhibit 
T). The jury in the trial court returned a verdict of no 
cause of action in favor of the defendant, and the lower 
court denied the appellant's motion for new trial; from 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The Plaintiff Howard E. Watkins was a young man 
28 years of age and married March 23, 1946. He was a 
veteran having served in the United States Army Field 
Artillery in the South Pacific area for 4lj2 years, during 
World War II (R. 52). He attended the Agricultural 
College in Logan, Utah for four years, majoring in busi-
:p.ess administration, and had completed his course except 
for two or three quarters (R. 53). He moved to St. George 
in 1950, where he was employed as an automobile sales-
man up until the time of the accident (R. 58). The colli-
sion occurred on U. S. Highway 91, about 7 miles north 
of Paragonah, Utah on the Buckhorn Flat (Exhibit P). 
The oil portion of the highway all across the Buckhorn 
Flat varies from 18¥2 to 20 feet in width (R. 36-37); the 
shoulder on each side of the oiled portion was about 2 
feet wide at the bridge shown on Exhibit G (R. 232); the 
bridge shown on Exhibit G was over a dry wash about 
15 feet wide and deep enough to bury a car (R. 36). The 
accident occurred at night at approximately 10:00 o'clock 
P.M. (Exhibit P). The plaintiff testified that he saw the 
headlights of the defendant's truck on his side of the high-
way, (R. 80-81); that the truck appeared to be over-
lapping his side of the road ; that he got his right wheels 
on the shoulder about a foot and a half or two feet when 
the bridge loomed up. It was either hit the bridge or go 
into the gulley, or try to get back on the road and pass the 
truck (R. 60-61). The left front headlight of the plain-
tiff's Ford collided with the left front corner of the 
truck-bed, and the truck ripped through the entire left 
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side of the plaintiff's Ford, the Ford remaining in con-
tact with the truck bed for the full length of the car 
(Exhibits E and F). The only part of the truck that was 
really damaged was the extreme corner of the rack (R. 
48--U1, Exhibit F). There was no damage to the front 
fender or to any of the truck in front of the bed of the 
truck (R.49). 
Highway Patrolman Ernest Pearce who was at 
the scene of the accident, testified that he observed 
tire burns on the highway in the vicinity of the 
bridge on the evening of the accident. The tire burns be-
gan between 10 and 20 feet north of the bridge going 
in a northerly direction (R. 32). There was no center line 
stripe on the highway at that place. The officer described 
the tire burns as starting east of the center line and 
swinging across the road and back, and then across the 
road again ·with the car coming to rest about 400 feet 
from the bridge ( R. 33). On the second turn back to the 
point where the car came to rest, the tire burns changed 
from just a burn or brake mark to a rim gouge. The rim 
gouge, starting at the beginning of the last turn and re-
maining more or less constant to the point where the Ford 
came to rest, appeared to be the path taken by the left 
front wheel after the left front tire had been thrown from 
the Yehicle (R. 34). The tire was picked up by the witness, 
Claude E. Burton, the following morning. The tire was 
located on the east side of the road straight across from 
the Ford automobile (R. 260). Officer Pearce placed two 
ink crosses on Exhibit G to identify the point where he 
figured tlw tire burns started. He was unable to see any 
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tire burns in line with those indicated on Exhibit G south 
of that point (R. 41). The officer also testified that rasp-
berries were sea ttered in all directions, but there was a 
definite course of the raspberries pretty well toward the 
center of the road about 160 feet south of the bridge (R. 
41). Officer Pearce stated that the tire burn represented 
the car going forward rather than in a side-slip .. 
Theodore Atherly, a witness called on behalf 
of the plaintiff, testified that he was at the scene of the 
accident before the plaintiff was removed to the hospital; 
he observed the markings on the highway about 4 feet 
from the center line on the east side and about 10 feet 
from the bridge. He identified the ink crosses on Exhibit 
G as representing the location of the tire marks he saw 
on that night. He traced the marks from the car back 
to the point indicated on the exhibit; he saw no other tire 
burns of any kind extending south of the point indicated 
by the ink crosses (R. 115). The distance between the 
left-hand tire burn and the center of the highway was 
about 4 feet (R. 116). The witness walked back and forth 
from the injured man's automobile to the bridge area. 
At the bridge there were a few pieces of boards and some 
fruit had been scattered across the highway; the fruit 
took a course right down the middle of the highway (R. 
117). There were automobile headlights shining on the 
area in the vicinity of the bridge almost all the time. The 
skid marks were very plain. He recalls definitely noting 
in his mind at the time of the accident that the skid marks 
started about 10 feet north of the bridge; the tire burns 
were wider in some places than at others, which was in-
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dicated where he had crossed the road side-ways (R. 
118-1:2:2). 
There was a split in authority as to the ong1n of 
tire burns between the two highway patrolmen who in-
Yestigated the accident. As formerly stated, Highway 
Patrolman Ernest Pearce testified that the crosses indi-
cated on Exhibit G showed the commencement of the tire 
burns ; however Officer Simmons on behalf of the 
defendant testified that he noticed two gouge marks just 
north of the bridge and that the southerly most gouge 
mark was approximately 2 feet from the center of the 
road on the west side, and about 5 to 7 feet north of the 
bridge, and \\·as about 2 inches wide and 3 to 4 inches 
ltmg (R. 307). The second gouge mark was longer and 
more jagged, and was about 11-h feet north and 6 to 8 
inches east of the first gouge mark, and was west of the 
center. However, on the night of the impact he considered 
the center of the raspberry smear as the point of impact 
(R. 314). In his notes of his investigation ,made the night 
of the accident (Exhibit N) the officer then showed the 
point of impact to be 165 feet south of the bridge and 
165 paces from the bridge to the plaintiff's car; yet the 
officer at the trial stated that he didn't believe any of the 
officers, including himself, thought that the point of im-
pact was the center of the smear (R. 315). The exhibit 
originally showed the measurement of 17 feet 10 inches 
from the point of impact to the east shoulder, but the 
officer corrected it to be 11 feet 10 inches at the trial (R. 
318). The officer again made the mistake of 100 feet in his 
notl•s of the measurement from the point of supposed 
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impact to the bridge. On Exhibit N he showed it to be 
165 and at the trial he stated it was 65 feet. He took 
a measurement of 165 paces from the bridge to the plain-
tiff's car; he took no measurement whatsoever to the 
truck; he took the driver of the truck's word and was 
not concerned about the measurement of the truck (R. 
321). In his report to the State Highway Patrol, he show-
ed the point of impact to be 700 feet from the Ford auto-
mobile; that is from the center of the raspberry smear to 
the plaintiff's car (R. 322). The first time it ever occurred 
to him that he was 100 feet off in his measurement of the 
raspberry smear was the night before the trial. He did 
not make any note of gouge marks in his report or in his 
original notes (R. 323). The tire burns were still visible 
on the surface of the highway about one week following 
the accident (R. 326). He identified the tire burns on 
Exhibit G and could see no other tire burns extending 
south from the point marked by the crosses on the ex-
hibit. Exhibit I showed the tire burns made by the Ford 
and was apparently an extension of the tire burns shown 
on Exhibit G (R. 327). Exhibit 0 was the original report 
of the officer which showed the 65 foot point to be 165 feet 
(R. 330). He admitted testifying under oath in his 
deposition taken before the trial that he came to an agree-
ment with the other officers that the point of impact was 
the center of the raspberry smear, and that was 165 feet 
from the bridge; that he measured the distance with a tape 
(R. 333). And to further indicate the thoroughness of his 
investigation, although there were quite a few people at 
the scene of the accident, he took the names of no one (R. 
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340). Although the only measurements he took had refer-
ence to the center of the raspberry smear, the officer 
testified at the trial that he didn't believe any of the 
officers, including himself, thought that the point of im-
pact was in the center of the smear (R. 315), and this, 
notwithstanding his admitted testimony on the deposition 
that he agreed with the officers that the center of the 
raspberry smear was the probable point of impact. 
Sheriff Arthur X elson testifying on behalf of 
the defendant stated that he saw what looked like 
a fresh gouge in the highway surface (R. 264), but he 
could not say whether the gouge mark was made the day 
before the accident or not. He did not measure from 
the gouge marks, but he estimated that they were two 
feet from the center of the highway which was purely a 
guess. It is significant that he saw no tire burns at all 
connecting the scuff mark up with the tire burns that were 
about 4 to 5 feet east of the center line (R. 267). The way 
the tracks started between the two tire burns was about 
the width of an automobile between the two rear wheels 
(R. 270). The sheriff claimed that there were no 
gouge marks between the point where the tire burns 
started and where the car made its final turn back to 
where it came to rest. He thought the tire came off right 
near where the first gouge mark was made, but he 
didn't know (R. 271-272). He claimed that there was a 
piece of rubber imbedded between the tire band rim of the 
truck and the truck bed, and the rear wheel of the truck 
was scuffed on the east side. The raspberry stain went 
over the center of the highway as much as 2 or 3 feet and 
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extended for a distance of about 60 feet south of the bridge 
(R. 278-279). The tire burn started about 4 or 5 feet east 
of the gouge marks (R. 285). The presence of these gouge 
marks was also testified to by William C. Dalton 
who appeared on behalf of defendant. He thought the 
gouge marks were just slightly on the west side of the 
road. He presumed they were made by the Ford wheel 
(R. 252-254). 
Testifying in rebuttal on behalf of the plaintiff, the 
witness Theodore Atherly stated that he did not 
see any tire burns near the center of the highway that 
took a course east of the highway before making a turn to 
the west. He further stated that he looked in the area be-
tween the bridge and where the burns first appeared to 
see if there were other tire burns indicated on the pave-
ment, and there were no others. He saw some gouges 
there but didn't think they were from the accident. He 
further stated that there was nothing there to indicate 
a connection between the gouge and the tire burns which 
first apeared on the highway (R. 362). 
Officer Pearce testified in rebuttal that he was 
going up and down the highway with his flashlight, 
and that the area around the bridge was fairly well lit 
by headlights of cars and flares; that he did not observe 
any tire burns which originated at or near the center of 
the highway and proceeded in a northeasterly direction 
before they made the trip across to the west shoulder (R. 
363-364). The burns indicated by the ink crosses on 
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Exhibit G represent the first indication of tire burns or 
marks upm~ the highway that he observed (R. 364). 
The witness Glen C. Garfield who was a school-
teacher and a passenger in the defendant's truck testifi-
ed that the wheels of the truck appeared to be on the very 
far edge of the highway (R. 77). He stated that he did not 
Sl'e the bridge until they were very close to it although he 
was watching down the side of the road (R. 186-187). 
He stated that the plaintiff's car was proceeding in a 
normal manner as it approached, except for relative ap-
parent speed which was the speed he judged before the 
plaintiff's automobile got within a quarter of a mile 
(R. 186-187). He stated that the plaintiff's car was 
probably travP.ling with its lights on dim when he last 
observed it. He stated that the truck was loaded with 
about six tons of feed and there were several cases of 
raspberries which were being carried in the tool box, 
which wa~ located under the left corner; that it was not 
quite out to the edge of the body of the truck (R. 181). 
He stated that he was not conscious of the truck's apply-
ing its brak8s anytime before the impact, and that the 
truck did not alter its course at all as plaintiff's car ap-
proached prior to the impact but maintained a straight 
course down the highway. He stated the truck was not 
on the shoulder prior to impact (R. 189-190). He did 
not think that at any time prior to impact did the truck's 
wheels get over to the right shoulder (R. 191). He stated 
that the impact of the collision made little effect on the 
forward movement of the truck. It just threw the pas-
senger forward a little, but did not cause the truck to 
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change its course noticeably (R. 193). This fact is signi-
ficant in that it indicates the contact of the Ford with the 
truck was strictly a sideswipe and confirms the testimony 
of the plaintiff to the effect that he just turned slightly 
towards the truck in order to miss hitting the bridge. If 
he haJ turned sharply into the truck, it is inconceivable 
that the truck would have continued to proceed on an un-
altered course despite the force of the impact. The wit-
nesse Garfield claimed that the truck stopped about 200 
feet after impact and then the truck driver pulled up 
again about 300 feet onto the shoulder. When they went 
back to the scene of the accident, he saw fragments of 
broken boxes in the vicinity of the bridge (R. 195). He 
said there was just a trickle of raspberries even with 
the bridge, the bulk were down just a distance from the 
bridge (R. 196). He also stated that the impact was just 
north of the bridge (R. 200-201). By the time the witness 
got back to the scene of the accident, there were two car-
loads of football players from Minnesota who had stopped 
and rendered assistance to the plaintiff ( R. 179). With-
out knowing whether or not the chains had been moved) 
he picked up some chains a little bit north of the bridge. 
There were cars going back and forth at the time (R.180). 
He saw several tools scattered along the highway 
(R. 181), and part of the front fender of the Ford car 
was stuck in the corner of the truck bed, and a piece of 
tire from plaintiff's car was imbedded in the rim of the 
truck's rear wheel (R. 182). He said the bulk of the 
raspberries were about the bridge and in the center of the 
road (R. 183). 
10 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
It is inh"n'stiug to note that after impact, as the 
truck continued to pull ahead, it was trailing raspberries 
which overlapped the center of the highway, even though 
the truck was ostensibly pulling off the road to stop. It 
i~ not altogether unlikely that the gouge mark which the 
officers thought may haYe been made by the tire-covered 
rim of plaintiff's left wheel were in fact made by the fall-
ing of the tools onto the highway or by the passing of 
traffic over the chains and the tools before they were re-
moved from the highway. These tools were carried under-
neath the truck and could have been knocked t.o the west 
some distance hy the force of the sideswiping impact, be-
fore they actually made contact with the ground. 
The truckdriver, Lamar W. lYiatheson testified 
that the truck was 23lj2 feet in length and that the bed of 
the truck was 94 inches (R. 218); that as he approached 
the bridge his speed was between 45 and 50 miles per 
hour (R. 220); that the plaintiff's lights were not blinding 
him, and when he first saw the plaintiff's car it was ap-
proximately two miles away, and he thought the car would 
clear his cab (R. 221). The truck was in close vicinity of 
the bridge abutment when the impact occurred. He 
claimed that the truck was at no time east of the center 
of the highway in the immediate vicinity of the bridge; he 
removed tools from the highway which were lying west of 
the center line. The tool box had been broken into pieces 
(R. 223-224). He stated that his lights were on low beam 
just before the accident (R. 225). He first saw the car 
about two miles away, and it appeared to be coming in a 
normal manner, and there was no indication that the Ford 
11 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
was weaving at all on the highway; it was coming straight 
(R. 228). Just a moment before the impact, the Ford did 
actually turn toward him (R. 229). Although the Ford 
did turn toward him, he did not alter his course other than 
the road required. At no time prior to the impact did he 
alter the straightforward course of his truck except as it 
followed the contour of the road, and there were no curves 
in the road between the roadside park and the bridge. He 
stated that the plaintiff's lights were not blinding him 
(R. 236), that the plaintiff seemed to dim his lights, 
and the truckdriver dimmed his (R. 240). He stated 
that after he saw the Ford coming, as it got close to him 
he didn't move over at all, and that he was over on his 
extreme left side of the pavement. Thereupon counsel 
for the defendant corrected him with the following langu-
age: ''You mean left side or right side¥'' To which he 
answered, "West, or right" (R. 230). He said that he 
did not feel a jolt from the impact; that the force of the 
impact had no effect on his position in the truck. The 
first indication of the impact he had was a terrible noise 
just behind the driver's seat, and that he was too close to 
the bridge at the time of the impact to see (R. 231) Here-
membered the shoulder at the bridge to be approximately 
two feet wide (R. 232). After the impact he remained con-
stantly in the direction he was going until he pulled off 
the road. All four wheels of the truck were on the hard 
surface of the road for a distance of 275 feet after impact 
before the truck was pulled off the highway (R. 234). 
Officer Pearce had previously testified that he had talked 
with the driver of the defendant's truck, and the driver 
12 
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had told him he thought he was on his side of the road; 
that the driYer didn't ~tate it definitely (H. ~12-213). 
\Yhl'll asked about this conYersation with Officer Pearce, 
:Jlr. :Matheson stated that he did not recall it, although 
he did not deny that the statement was made (R. 235). 
Eridence Pertaining to Into.xication 
Jack Scott testified on behalf of the defendant 
that the plaintiff came to his place of business about 5:30 
o'clock in the e\·ening on the day of the accident, and 
was Ye1·y much intoxicated. The witness again, over the 
objection of the plaintiff, was permitted to testify to an 
incident which occurred in front of an adjoining store, 
during the course of which the plaintiff was said to have 
addressed another man thusly: ''Hi, Stupid'' and was 
said to have made threatening gestures with a 22 rifle 
which he was carrying at the time. 
Another witness for the defendant, Robert Tuckett 
testified that the plaintiff made threatening gestures 
with the rifle after an exchange of unpleasant words 
between the witness and the plaintiff R. 135). 
Another witness for the defendant, Layron Chris-
tenson who was manager of a hardware store in 
( ~edar City, testified that he saw the plaintiff around 
5:30; that he was a little bit drunk, and wanted to sell the 
witness a gun ( R. 137). 
Another witness for the defendant, Kent T. Farns-
worth, te~t ified that he was operating Ted's Bar 
13 
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the day of the accident, and that the plaintiff came 
into the bar around 6:30 in the evening; that the plain-
tiff was unstable, although the witness figured he was all 
right to be served a beer. However, the plaintiff tipped 
the glass of beer over and the witness refused to serve 
plaintiff any more beer, whereupon the plaintiff became 
belligerent, and it was necessary for the witness to show 
him to the door (R. 139). The appearance of the plaintiff 
as he came into the beer parlor was that of a man who 
had been drinking, but who was carrying himself well at 
that time and he felt he could sell plaintiff a glass of 
beer without violating the rules and without rendering 
plaintiff drunk (R. 140-141). 
Orissa Hirschi, an employee of the Circus Lounge, 
another tavern in Cedar City, saw the plaintiff in 
the Circus Lounge between 8 :00 and 8 :30 that evening. 
She described the plaintiff as very insulting and quite 
loud-mouthed (R. 143). 
The plaintiff was removed from the Circus Lounge 
by Police Officer William M. Hills, another witness, 
who testified on behalf of the defendant. He took the 
plaintiff for a ride in his car and engaged in a conversa-
tion with him (R. 150-154). He testified that if the plain-
tiff had been very drunk and causing trouble, he would 
have arrested him, and would not have turned him loose 
(R.157). He stated that the plaintiff was able to pull him-
self together in the tavern and walk reasonably straight, 
having some trouble with his speech but that he was able 
to carry on a reasonable, sensible conversation, and was-
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able to control himself fairly well (R. 158-160). The offi-
cer put the plaintiff in the plaintiff's car, but told him not 
to driYe it, and left him alone in the car (R. 162). 
High,Yay Patrolman Thomas H. Simmons called 
on behalf of the plaintiff testified he could smell 
the odor of alcohol on plaintiff's breath in the auto-
mobile a the scene of the accident (R. 304) and was of the 
opinion that plaintiff was under the influence of liquor 
R. 305). 
Highway Patrolman Ernest Pearce called on be-
half of the defendant testified that when he got 
to the scene of the accident, plaintiff was profaning and 
in a belligerent state of mind; that he was of the opinion 
that plaintiff was intoxicated. He did not know there 
was a gash on his temple at that time. He observed that 
the arm was very badly mangled, and in terrible condi-
tion, but did not observe the condition of the plaintiff's 
leg (R. 205-206). There ·was much blood on the floor of 
the car, plaintiff appearing to have lost a great deal of 
blood, and plaintiff was objecting to the fact that a 
doctor hadn't come. He appeared to be impatient about 
the fact a doctor hadn't come and the ·officer regarded 
that as an unusual thing (R. 207). When asked by coun-
sel for the plaintiff if he could tell with any degree of 
certainty whether the plaintiff was under the influence of 
liquor, the officer stated that he couldn't answer that 
question "yes" or "no" (R. 208). 
The driver of the defendant's truck, testifying on be-
half of the defendant relative to intoxication, stated that 
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he held the plaintiff's head, and was very close to him, 
but that he did not notice the smell of liquor on his breath, 
and did not know whether the plaintiff had been drink-
ing or not (Exhibit M). 
Doctor L. V. Broadbent of Cedar City, testifying 
on behalf of the defendant, stated that during the 
course of treatment at the hospital, the plaintiff used 
abusive language and was very antagonistic and objected 
strenuously to anything he attempted to do, although the 
plaintiff later apologized to him for his behavior on the 
following morning (R. 289-280). The doctor stated that 
he was of the opinion that plaintiff was intoxicated (R. 
291). However, on cross examination he stated that the 
patient when he saw him at 11:30 in the evening had a 
rapid thready pulse which indicated shock, and that 
when a person is under shock he is usually very depres-
sent, that is, slow to respond (R. 292); that he was in a 
profound degree of shock from acute blood loss; that his 
arm was dangling by a piece of muscle only, there being 
no bone connection on the arm at all, and most of the 
fleshy portion had been severed. He was not prepared to 
say that the plaintiff was definitely under the influence of 
intoxicating liquor (R. 293). That in a measure, the symp-
toms presented by plaintiff could be explained by the 
severe shock. Through the course of the night he had been 
given numerous drugs and sedatives. Being reminded of 
his previous deposition, the doctor acknowledged that he 
testified under oath previously that he didn't see evidence 
of intoxication, and couldn't say that the plaintiff had 
consumed alcoholic beverage prior to the time he saw 
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him, ( R. ~95). Then over the objection of plaintiff, the 
doctor was permitted to giYe repetitious testimony about 
the very belligerent, obstreperous behavior of the plain-
tiff, and about his use of profane language (R. 297 -298). 
Phyllis X elson, a nurse on duty in the hospital, 
testifying on behalf of the defendant relative to in-
toxication, stated that she noticed the smell of liquor on 
the plaintiff's breath, (R. 352). Over the objection of 
the plaintiff, the witness was asked to testify about the 
language the plaintiff used in the hospital, and she stated 
that he was profane, belligerent, and uncooperative in 
every way (R. 353). She was of the opinion that plaintiff 
was under the influence of liquor (R. 354). Again, over 
the objection of plaintiff, the witness was permitted to 
testify repetitiously that the plaintiff used abusive lan-
guage and was hard to handle (R. 354). 
STATEMENT OF POINTS UPON WHICH 
APPELLANT RELIES 
Point I. There was insufficient evidence of intoxica.., 
tion of the plaintiff at the time of the collision to 
warrant the submission of that issue to the jury, 
and there was no evidence that intoxication was a 
proximate or contrilntfing cause of the collision. 
Point II. The plaintiff was entitled to have his case sub-
mitted to the jury upon the theory of his evidence as 
well as upon the theory of the whole evidence. 
Point III. The plaintiff 1cas deprived of a fair and im-
partial trial by the i1nproper admission of evidence 
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that was calculated to inflame and confuse the jury, 
and stifle their minds with prejudice and hatred 
toward the plaintiff. 
Point IV. The court erred ~n failing to grant Plain-
tiff's motion for a new trial. 
ARGUMENT 
Point I. There was insufficient evidence of intoxica-
tion of the plaintiff at the time of the collision to 
warrant the submission of that issue to the jury, 
and there was no evidence that intoxication was a 
proximate or contributing cause of the collision. 
In this case, the ultimate question to be decided by 
the jury was whether the truck overlapped the center of 
the road at the narrow bridge and thereby caused the 
collision. This question was clouded and subordinated in 
the minds of the jury by testimony on the intoxi-
cation of the plaintiff several hours prior to the 
accident. The witness Jack Scott testified that at 5 :00 
o'clock on the day of the accident the plaintiff came in to 
his place of business very much intoxicated. One half 
hour later, the plaintiff went to the hardware store, 
managed by the witness Layron Christensen, for the pur-
pose of selling his 22 rifle. Mr. Christenson said that the 
plaintiff was a little bit drunk at that time (R. 137). An 
hour later, about 6:30, the plaintiff was said to have gone 
into Ted's Bar where the witness Farnsworth thought he 
was all right to be served another beer, but when he ob-
served the plaintiff tipped the glass of beer over he didn't 
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serve him any more beer. He said that the plaintiff be-
came belligerent, and that it was necessary for him to 
show plaintiff to the door, (R.. 139). He testified that the 
appearance of the plaintiff was that of a man who had 
been drinking, but who ·was carrying it well at the time, 
and that he could sell him a glass of beer without violating 
the rules and without rendering the plaintiff drunk (R.. 
140-141.) The witness Orissa Hirschi, an employee of 
the Circus Lounge in Cedar City, Utah saw the plaintiff 
between 8 :00 and 8 :30. She sold him no beer and he was 
escorted from the lounge by the police officer. He had 
been very insulting and quite loud-mouthed. She stated 
that the plaintiff carried himself well after the officer 
arrived (R.. 146). The last witness to have any personal 
contact with the plaintiff prior to the collision was the 
police officer William 1\I. Hills of Cedar City, who went to 
the Circus Lounge where he saw the plaintiff, and he said 
that the plaintiff had the appearance of being intoxi-
cated. He conducted the plaintiff from the tavern, and 
the plaintiff walked fairly straight until they got to the 
foot of the stairs where he was quite wobbly, and the offi-
cer took hold of his arm; however he stated that as an 
officer in Cedar City, if a man was very drunk and causing 
trouble, he would arrest him and not turn him loose again; 
that he took the plaintiff for a ride during which the 
plaintiff engaged in an intelligent conversation. He 
stated that although the plaintiff was having some trouble 
with his speech, he was able to carry on a reasonably 
sensible conversation (R.. 158-159), and was able to con-
trol himself fairly well (R.. 160). The officer put the 
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plaintiff in his car, rather than arresting him, and told 
him not to drive it and left him alone in the car at about 
8:45 (Exhibit 1). There is some testimony to the effect 
that the plaintiff was intoxicated at the scene of the acci-
dent, but it must be remembered in this connection that 
the plaintiff had sustained a severe blow to his temple 
with a laceration of the head which required suturing 
(R. 18), and Dr. Milligan considered him to have sustain-
ed a concussion of the brain. Plaintiff's left arm was 
hanging by a ribbon of muscle and he had sustained shat-
tering fractures of the left leg, which later required am-
putation. Before the tourniquet had been applied to the 
plaintiff's arm he had lost a great deal of blood. He was 
at the scene an hour to an hour and a half before medical 
aid arrived. Officer Pearce based his testimony that the 
plaintiff was under the influence of liquor at the scene of 
the accident upon two things : First, that he had the odor 
of alcohol on his breath, and second that he was profaning 
and in a belligerent state of mind. He stated that the 
plaintiff was objecting to the fact that a doctor hadn't 
come, and appeared to be impatient, and he regarded that 
as an unusual thing (R. 207). When asked by counsel if 
he could tell with any degree of certainty whether the 
plaintiff was under the influence of liquor, the officer 
stated that he couldn't answer that question "yes" or 
"no" (R. 208). The driver of the defendant's truck, 
LaMar W. Matheson, testifying on behalf of the defend-
ant stated that although he held the plaintiff's head and 
was very close to him the witness did not notice the smell 
of liquor on the plaintiff's breath and did not know 
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whether the plaintiff had been drinking or not (Exhibit 
:M). William C. Dalton, another \Yitness called on behalf 
of the defendant, who was present at the scene of the acci-
dent, gaYe no evidence relatiYe to the intoxication of the 
plaintiff. ~-\.rthur X el~on, Sheriff of Iron County, who was 
present and participate~ in the investigation of the acci-
dent gave no testimony relatiYe to the intoxication of the 
plaintiff. Thomas H. Simmons, highway patrolman who 
likewise was present and investigated the accident, testi-
fied that he was of the opinion that the plaintiff was 
under the influence of liquor, and he could smell the odor 
of alcohol on plaintiff's breath in the automobile (R. 304-
305). On the other hand, Theodore Atherly testified in re-
buttal that he '''ent over to the car where Howard Watkins 
was lying four or five times, and there was nothing about 
his appearance that indicated he was under the influence 
of intoxicating liquor. Considering the severity of the 
plaintiff's injuries, the large quantity of blood he had 
lost, the blow on the head, with the resulting concussion, 
together with the fact that he was at the scene of the 
accident for over an hour before medical help ar-
rived, we do not think that his protesting against the 
delay in the arrival of doctors could reasonably be taken 
by anyone as indication of insobriety. Certainly there 
was no plausible evidence of any kind, other than the odor 
of alcohol on the plaintiff's breath, which could provide a 
basis for the opinions expressed by the two highway 
patrolmen at the scene of the accident, and one of these 
officers as pointed out admitted that he could not say 
with any degree of certainty that the plaintiff was under 
the influence of liquor at the scene of the accident. 
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In the case of Flemming vs. McMillan, West Virginia 
26 S.E. 2d 8 appears the following: 
''The evidence with respect to the intoxication 
of defendant at the time of the accident in which 
Ada Flemming lost her life is not persuasive. It is 
true that all the witnesses stated that the defend-
ant had the odor of liquor on his breath at the time 
and place where the body of Ada Flemming was 
found. The witnesses were law enforcement offi-
cers, one being a constable and the other a state 
policeman. These officers did not arrest the de-
fendant and apparently they had no reason to do 
so. The constable testified that at some time prior 
to the accident he could smell alcoholic liquor on 
the defendant's breath, and that he kept repeating 
words, but the same witness testified that at the 
place of the accident on Route 50, defendant still 
retained the odor of intoxicating liquor, but that 
he, the constable, observed nothing unusual in con-
versation or conduct of the defendant. The other 
officer observed nothing unusual on the part of the 
defendant at that time and place. The evidence as 
to intoxication of defendant fails in that it does 
not appear that his indulgence in the use of such 
was the proximate cause of the tragedy." 
Another case in point is that of State vs. Johnson 
76 Utah 84 287 P. 909. In that case, which was a man-
slaughter case, there was evidence that five people in the 
evening were walking across the intersection of 4th South 
and 2nd East, Salt Lake City, crossing from the south to 
the north on the east side of 2nd East, and had reached 
a point approximately 15 feet from the north curb line of 
4th South when an automobile headed east and driving on 
the north side of the street at 40 miles per hour crashed 
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into the group, killing two of the persons, and wounding 
another. A baby was being carried in the arms of its mother 
at the time of the accident. This baby was hurdled from 
its mother's arms through the windshield of the car and 
into the driYer's seat, and carried away. The car did not 
stop or eYen slacken its speed on account of the accident. 
The baby was later found at the home of the defendant, 
to which place it had been carried by him in the auto-
mobile which he had been driving. Defendant did not 
report the accident to the police station nor take the 
baby, which was bleeding and dying, either to the station 
or emergency hospital or to any public place, but took it 
to his home. The defendant's father called the chief of 
police who went to the defendant's home about 10:00 
o'clock and testified that he asked the defendant about 
the accident, but that the defendant didn't seem to know 
a great deal about it at the time; and that when he asked 
the defendant about the accident and where the trouble 
had happened, the defendant simply shook his head and 
did not seem to want to talk very much, and was very 
much excited. The officer stated that he noted a consider-
able odor of liquor on the defendant's breath. The fore-
going facts appear in the dissenting opinion of Justice 
Folland, page 107 and 108 of the Utah Reports. At the 
conclusion of the evidence, the defendant requested the 
court to withhold from the jury the charge that he was 
under the influence of liquor on the ground of insuffici-
ency of evidence to support such charge. The request was 
refused and the charge with the other alleged unlawful 
acts submitted to the jury, who returned a verdict of 
guilty of involuntary manslaughter. The court held that 
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the evidence was insufficient to warrant the submission of 
the issue of intoxication to the jury. 'Ve quote from the 
decision, commencing at the middle of page 89 of the 
Utah Reports : 
" . In addition to the testimony that the 
chief of police, more than three hours after the 
accident, on going near the defendant in his house 
to get, as he testified, a 'whiff' of the defendant's 
breath and observed' a considerable odor of liquor 
on his breath,' the other matters so pointed to in 
support of the ruling and to show that the defend-
ant was under the influence of intoxicating liquor 
consist of the evidence, though in conflict, that the 
defendant just before the accident drove the car 
against a red light, drove it on the wrong side of 
the street, drove it at an excessive speed, and 
operated it against others at a street crossing. 
Though there was sufficient evidence to show that 
the defendant committed some or all of such al-
leged unlawful acts charged in the information, it 
does not relevantly or probatively follow that he 
was guilty of the alleged unlawful act of driving 
the car while he was under the influence of intoxi-
cating liquor. In other words, driving an automo-
bile in violation of traffic rules or ordinances in 
one or more particulars, or driving negligently or 
even recklessly, resulting in an accident, does not 
relevantly tend to prove the driver was under the 
influence of intoxicating liquor. There is no pro-
bative relation of the one to the other. It may not 
be doubted that many 'as sober as a judge' and as 
often have driven automobiles against red lights, 
frequently violated the speed limit, or otherwise 
violated traffic rules and met with or caused acci-
dent through such violations or negligent driving. 
To characterize such acts as relevantly tending to 
show intoxication is to characterize a large percent 
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of automobile driYers as being intoxicated or 
under the influence of intoxicating liquors while 
operating automobiles. General rules governing 
probatiYe effects of evidence should not be dis-
regarded or prostrated to suit emergencies of a 
particular case. 
''It further in effect is observed that though 
the evidence be regarded as insufficient to show 
that the defendant was under the influence of 
intoxicating liquor, still he was not prejudiced be-
cause such issue was admitted to the jury for the 
reason that there was ample evidence to sustain 
the conYiction of the other unlawful alleged acts. 
The question presented is not one of sufficiency of 
evidence to justify the verdict or judgment. No 
such complaint is made. The question presented 
is as to whether error was committed in sub-
mitting to the jury a material issue upon which it 
is claimed there was insufficient evidence to sup-
port it, and if so whether the error was prejudicial. 
If in a civil case \vhere several acts of negligence 
are charged, each constituting actionable negli-
gence, and the evidence is insufficient as to one of 
such acts, but against objections nevertheless is 
submitted to the jury and a general verdict render-
ed in favor of the plaintiff, hardly anyone would 
contend that no prejudice resulted on the ground 
that the evidence was sufficient to sustain the ver-
dict on the other alleged acts . . . Letting all the 
issues as to all of the alleged unlawful acts go to 
the jury gave them to understand that they could 
render a verdict of guilty on any one or all of them 
which was required to 'be expressed only by a gen-
eral verdict. Some of the jurors may have been in-
duced to join in the verdict on one or more of the 
alleged acts, some on other alleged acts but on 
which or on all it is impossible to tell. That none 
of the jury was induced to join in the verdict be-
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case of the submission of the issue as to intoxica-
tion is also impossible to tell. We cannot review a 
criminal action like an equity case-try it de novo 
on the record-and ourselves determine the guilt 
or innocence of the defendant, the weight to be 
given conflicting evidence, the credibility of the 
witness, or the weight or credit to be given the 
claim or testimony of the defendant. Though the 
evidence may amply or satisfactorily sustain the 
conviction, yet it is not within our province to 
determine the guilt of the defendant and in such 
case justify erroneous and adverse rulings against 
him nonprejudicial. That is to say, if on the 
record we think a defendant guilty or ought to 
have been convicted, we may not regard any kind 
of a trial good enough for him (italics ours). We 
thus think the ruling not only erroneous, but also 
prejudicial. Its very nature had a tendency and 
was calculated to do harm, and on the record we 
cannot say it did no harm or did not influence the 
verdict. The test of determining prejudicial error 
is stated in Jensen v. Utah Railway Co. (Utah) 
270 P. 349." 
See also Rogers vs. Silverfleet System of Memphis, 
(Louisiana) 180 S. 445 from which we take the following 
quotation: 
But before discussing this physical evidence, 
we will make the observation that from a careful 
study of the evidence we do not think that Rogers 
was drinking or that he was under the influence of 
intoxicating liquors to the extent that his ability 
to drive the truck was affected. Without analyz-
ing the voluminous testimony on this point, two 
factors would suffice to justify this conclusion: 
first the fact that defendant's own witness Bill 
Badgett did not testify that Rogers was drunk, 
notwithstanding the fact that Badgett and 1\1:angle 
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were in a better position to know whether· or not 
Rogers was under the influence of liquor than any-
one else, and second if Rogers had been drinking 
befor he left Brookhaven, or drunk before leaving 
there, some four or five hours had elapsed before 
the accident, and it is not probable that he would 
have then been under the influence of liquor ... " 
In the case at bar, there was no substantial evidence 
other than the odor of alcohol on the plaintiff's breath 
at the scene of the accident that indicated intoxication, 
and the evidence of the defendant, who had the burden 
of establishing intoxication, was to the effect that intoxi-
cation could not have been determined with any degree 
of certainty. The two cases just cited are authority to the 
effect that the odor of liquor alone on the breath of the 
plaintiff is not sufficient evidence to warrant submission 
of the issue to the jury. It is significant that the driver 
of the defendant's truck, LaMar W. Matheson, testify-
ing on behalf of the defendant stated that he first saw the 
plaintiff's car about two miles away and that it appeared 
to be coming in a normal manner and there was no evi-
dence or indication that the Ford was weaving at all on 
the highway, but that it was coming straight (R. 228). 
That he actually dimmed his lights and the other driver's 
lights were not blinding him, and the other car seemed to 
dim its lights (R. 236 and 240). He testified that just a 
moment before the impact the Ford actually did turn to-
ward him (R. 229). This corroborates the testimony of 
the plaintiff to the effect that the truck was overlapping 
the center, and he had to get onto the shoulder, and when 
the bridge came into view, he had to turn toward the 
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truck in an attempt to squeeze between the truck and the 
bridge. To demonstrate the sobriety of his judgment, if 
the truck had moved towards its side of the road another 
six inches, there would have been no accident. Confronted 
with the alternative of hitting the wash which was deep 
enough to bury his car, or of hitting the concrete abut-
ment which promised certain death, or of attempting to 
squeeze through between the bridge and the center-
overlapping truck, the plaintiff certainly took the most 
reasonable alternative. It seems incredibly unreason-
able on the part of the trJ.Ick driver to maintain his bull-
headed straightforward course down the middle of the 
highway without yielding one inch to the plaintiff. A rea-
sonable and altogether sober man in plaintiff's predica-
ment certainly would have been justified in entertaining 
the hope that the truck would yield sufficiently to plain-
tiff's side of the road to permit him to pass through. Tak-
ing all the evidence as a whole, the proximate cause was 
the failure of the defendant's truck driver to alter his 
middle-of-the-road course a few inches to the right in 
order to permit the plaintiff to pass on the narrow bridge. 
Again the witness Glen C. Garfield, who also testi-
fied on behalf of the defendant and who was a passenger 
in the defendant's truck, stated that when he saw the car 
approaching it was in the distance (R. 185), and the last 
time he saw the car it was a quarter of a mile away, and 
as the plaintiff's car approached, it did so in a normal 
manner, except for the relative apparent speed (R. 186-
187). He stated that the plaintiff's car was probably 
traveling with its lights on dim when he last observed it 
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(R. 189). We fail to perceive how it can reasonably be 
eontended that planitiff was driving his ear under the 
influence of intoxicating liquor at the time of the impact 
when the two eye witnesses to the accident, who testified 
on behalf of the defendant, stated that he operated his 
vehicle in a normal manner. It is also significant that 
without any proof of any intervening drinking on the 
part of the plaintiff, approximately five hours had 
elapsed since the witness who managed the hardware 
store testified that he appeared to be a little drunk 
(R. 270). There is no substantial conflict in the physical 
evidence. The point of impact was just north of the 
bridge according to the defendant's witness who was a 
passenger in the truck, and although that witness asserted 
that the truck was on its side of the road, nevertheless the 
tire burns made by the plaintiff's automobile as it 
established its contact with the truck about 10 feet north 
of the bridge are still clearly visible in the photograph, 
Exhibit G. The westernmost tire burn was located 4 feet 
east of the center of the highway, according to Highway 
Patrolman Pearce, Sheriff~ elson and Theodore Atherly; 
and although the truck after impact was pulling off the 
side of the road to stop, it left a tell-tale trail of rasp-
berries which overlapped the center line for a distance of 
approximately 60 feet after impact, and those raspberries 
were falling from the left front corner of the truck. The 
effect of this physical evidence showing defendant's un-
deniable encroachment on the plaintiff's side of the road 
at the narrow bridge is not substantially disturbed by the 
defendant's statement to Highway Patrolman Pearce that 
he thought he was on his own side of the road. The physi-
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cal evidence corroborates the testimony of the plain-
tiff relative to the truck's position on his side of the road. 
True, there was some testimony relative to gouges which 
were thought to have been caused by the left front wheel 
of the Ford when it struck the truck near the bridge, but 
the physical evidence showed that the left tire was still on 
the Ford as it laid its burns shown on Exhibit G, and that 
tire was not thrown until just before the Ford made its 
last crossing of the highway. This is definitely shown by 
the continuous rim mark which appeared on that last turn 
opposite the point where the tire was found. The wit-
ness Atherly testifying in rebuttal stated that he saw 
some gouges but didn't think they were from the accident, 
and there was nothing to indicate a connection between 
the gouge and the tire burns which first appeared on the 
highway (R. 362). 
Instruction No.5, which the court gave the jury, read 
as follows: 
''You are instructed that it is a violation of the 
law of this state for any person who is under the 
influence of intoxicating liquor to be in actual 
physical control of any motor vehicle. Under the 
influence of intoxicating liquor means in such con-
dition from the use of intoxicating liquor so as to 
impair the person's ability to drive an automobile 
in the manner that an ordinarily prudent and cau-
tious person in full possession of his faculties 
would operate a similar vehicle under like con-
ditions. 
''If you find from a preponderance of the evi-
dence in this case that the plaintiff, while driving 
his car immediately before and at the time of said 
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accident, was under the influence of intoxicating 
liquor as hereinbefore defined, then he was guilty 
of negligence as a matter of law, and if you further 
find from a preponderance of the evidence that 
his condition was the sole or proximate contribut-
ing cause of the collision with defendant's truck, 
then plaintiff cannot recover and your verdict 
must be for the defendant.'' 
Plaintiff excepted to the court's Instruction No. 5 and 
the whole thereof on the ground that there was insuffi-
cient evidence to show that the plaintiff was under the in-
fluence of liquor at the time of the accident in any extent 
or to the extent that it affected his operation of his 
vehicle. Plaintiff further excepted to the last paragraph 
of Instruction No. 5 and the particularly the part thereof 
which stated that plaintiff was guilty of negligence as a 
matter of law for the reason that such instruction was 
against the law and not applicable to the evidence (R. 
368-369). 
Plaintiff also excepted to the court's failure and 
refusal to give Plaintiff's Requested Instruction No. 1 
to the effect that they should disregard the evidence in the 
case pertaining to the consumption of beer by the plain-
tiff as being immaterial. 
We submit that the evidence being devoid of anything 
tending to show that the plaintiff was under the influence 
of liquor as he operated his vehicle immediately prior to 
and at the time of impact, the court was not justified in 
submitting that issue to the jury for their consideration. 
The burden was upon the defendant to show as a matter 
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of defense that the plaintiff was guilty of contributory 
negligence through being under the influence of liquor, 
and that such negligence contributed to or proximately 
caused the accident. Certainly that burden was not dis-
charged by the defendant when the two eye witnesses to 
the accident, the defendant's truck driver and his pas-
senger, both of whom were defendant's witnesses, testi-
fied that the plaintiff approached the scene of the colli-
sion in a normal manner. The defendant's truck driver 
who testified for the defendant and who held the plain-
tiff's head in his lap, was in a better position perhaps than 
anyone to determine whether he was under the influence 
of liquor. He did not testify that Plaintiff was intoxi-
cated, but on the contrary stated that he did not know 
whether the plaintiff had been drinking or not. It is true 
that Dr. L. V. Broadbent testifying on behalf of the de-
fendant said that some two hours after the accident he 
was of the opinion that the plaintiff was intoxicated. He 
however admitted that when he saw the patient, he had 
a rapid thready pulse which indicated a profound degree 
of shock from acute blood loss; that his arm was dangling 
by a piece of muscle only, and that he was not prepared 
to say that the plaintiff was definitely under the influence 
of intoxicating liquor. He admitted that in a measure the 
symptoms presented by the plaintiff could be explained 
by the severe shock and that during the course of the night 
the plaintiff had been given numerous drugs and seda-
tives. The doctor, reminded of his previous deposition, 
acknowledged that he testified under oath previously that 
he didn't see evidence of intoxication, and couldn't say 
that the plaintiff had consumed alcoholic beverage prior 
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to the time he saw him (R. 295 ), nor should any weight 
be giYen to the testimony of the nurse, Phyllis Nelson, who 
was willing to state that she was of the opinion that the 
plaintiff was intoxicated because there was the odor of 
liquor upon the patient's breath. 
"\Ve submit that the best evidence relative to the point 
of impact appears on Exhibit G which shows that the tire 
burns started very clearly on the plaintiff's side of the 
highway near the narrow bridge, and this evidence was 
Gorroborated by one of the highway patrolmen, Mr. 
Pearce, and by the witness Atherly. Such evidence pro-
vides a convincing and conclusive answer and repudiation 
of defendant's truck driver who told Officer Pearce that 
he thought he was on his side of the road. Again the phy-
sical evidence clearly corroborates the testimony of the 
plaintiff to the effect that the truck was overlapping the 
center of the road and that when the lights were dimmed 
of the two vehicles, and the bridge came into view, he 
was presented with the alternative of either almost cer-
tain death by striking the wash or hitting the concrete 
abutment, or taking the chance of squeezing through be-
tween the truck and the bridge hoping that the truck 
would yield sufficiently to allow him to go through. The 
plaintiff's version of the approach of the two vehicles to 
the point of impact was further corroborated by the testi-
mony of the defendant's truck driver to the effect that the 
plaintiff's Ford turned toward him just a moment before 
the impact. We submit that the decision made by the 
plaintiff and the course which he took were the decision 
and course of a sober man. The plaintiff's conduct seemed 
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far more reasonable than that of the defendant's truck 
driver who acknowledged that he maintained his heavily 
loaded truck on an unaltered course, even after the plain-
tiff turned his vehicle toward him. Yet if the defendant's 
truck driver had swerved his vehicle or moved it six more 
inches to the right-and he had ample room to do it on the 
highway-there would have been no collision. We feel 
compelled to inquire, who acted the more reasonably under 
the circumstances: the driver of the heavily loaded truck, 
overlapping the center of the highway who refused to 
alter the course of his vehicle one iota to make room at the 
narrow bridge, or the plaintiff who took the only course 
that justified a reasonable hope that the tragedy might 
be averted. The vital matter for the jury to have deter-
mined in this case was not whether the plaintiff acted in 
an unseemly manner in Cedar City in the early evening 
preceding the accident, and failed to cooperate with the 
doctor and the nurse hours after the accident in the hospi-
tal when they were cutting off his arm, sewing up his 
head, and attempting to do something for a leg injured 
beyond repair. Their clear duty was to determine from 
the evidence this issue: Who encroached upon the other 
man's side of the road at the narrow bridge. They were 
not assisted in arriving at that ultimate truth by anything 
other than the conduct of the operators of the two 
vehicles involved immediately prior to and at the scene of 
the collision, and by the physical evidence, most per-
suasive of which was the tire burn clearly shown on the 
photograph, Exhibit G. The jury's minds were diverted 
from these vital considerations by the invitation of the 
court to find against the plaintiff, if they thought that 
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the plaintiff was intoxicated and that his intoxication was 
a proximate or contributing cause of the accident, with-
out regard to the dearth of evidence in the record to sus-
tain such a finding. 
Point II. The plain-tiff was entitled to have his case sub-
mitted to the jury upon the theory of his evidence as 
well as upon the theory of the whole evidence. 
In this case, in its Instruction No. 5, the court sub-
mitted the issue of intoxication to the jury from the de-
fendant's standpoint only. In the instruction, they were 
told that if they found from a preponderance of the evi-
dence that the plaintiff while driving his car immediately 
before and at the time of the accident was under the in-
fluence of intoxicating liquor, that he was guilty of negli-
gence as a matter of law; and if they further found that 
his condition was the sole cause or a proximate contribut-
ing cause of the collision with defendant's truck, then 
plaintiff could not recover and their verdict must be for 
the defendant. At no place in its instructions did the 
court give the converse which would permit and instruct 
the jury to disregard the evidence of intoxication if they 
should find such intoxication was not a proximate or con-
tributing cause of the accident. The plaintiff requested 
the court to so instruct the jury in its requested instru-
ction No. 3, which instruction the court refused (R. 408). 
To this failure of the court, the plaintiff to an excep-
tion (R. 369). The principle involved in this point is a 
familiar one to this court, . and it has made many pro-
nouncements upon it. 
35 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
In the case of Morgan v. Bingham States Line Com-
pany 75 Utah 87, 283 P. 160, the court gave a general in-
struction on contributory negligence, as in the case at 
bar, the court gave a general instruction on intoxicating 
liquor. The defendant's request for a special instruction 
on contributory negligence was refused. The court said at 
page 105 of the Utah Reports: 
"A party is entitled to have his case sub-
mitted to the jury on the theory of his evidence as 
well as upon the theory of the whole evidence. 
Toone v. O'Neill Const. Co., 40 Utah 265, 121 P. 10: 
Hartley v. Salt Lake City, 41 Utah 121, 124 P. 522, 
523, and Miller v. Utah Consol. M. Co. et al., 53 
Utah 366, 178 P. 771; Pratt v. Utah Light and 
Traction Co., 57 Utah 7, 169 P. 868. 
The following language of Mr. Justice Straup 
in the case of Ha.rtley v. Salt Lake City, supra, is 
peculiarly applicable here: '' 'There are two par-
ties to a law suit. Each on a submission of the case 
to the jury is entitled to a submission of it on his 
theory and the law in respect thereof. The defend-
ant's theory as to the cause of the accident is em-
bodied in the proposed requests. There is some 
evidence as we have shown to render them applic-
able to the case. That is not disputed. We think 
the court's refusal to charge substantially as re-
quested was error. That the ruling was prejudicial 
and works a reversal of the judgment is self-
evident and unavoidable.' " ... 
While the requests are not models of accuracy, 
we think the defendants were entitled to have at 
least the substance of the same given so as to pre-
sent their theory of the evidence to the jury, and 
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The foregoing principle is reasserted in Webb v. 
Suow 102 Utah 435 at page 448, Pratt v. Utah Light and 
Traction Comp(J;ny 57 Utah 7 at Page 10. 
We quote from Jlorrison v. Parry, 104 Utah 151, 140 
P. 2d 77'2. at Page 162 Utah Reports: 
Defendant's theory which was supported by 
the evidence that the deceased, by driving on the 
left-hand side of the highway and his failure to 
turn to his right side in time to avoid creating an 
emergency would create an emergency through no 
fault of his. The court failed to properly separate 
the theories of the parties but instead gave general 
instructions treating the rights and the duties etc.'' 
The case of Metropolitan Life v. Adams, 37 Atlantic 
2d 345 holds as follows : 
"A party to a cause of action is entitled to 
have his theory submitted to the jury where sup-
ported by the evidence and the pleading and this 
makes it the duty of the court to submit all such 
issues both affirmative and negative.'' 
It is stated in Bjork v. U.S. Bobbin and Shuttle Com-
pany, (NH) 111 Atlantic 284: 
"While it has been held that if the jury are 
instructed in general terms as to the law applic-
able to the case, failure to instruct upon request as 
to the effect of particular evidence is not error, it 
is now considered that the fairness of a trial re-
quires that the judge shall inform the jury what 
the law is in its application to the case when a 
proper request is made.'' 
To the same effect are the following: .Jennings v. 
Cooper, (Missouri) 230 SW 325; Hurt v. Jurczcht, 
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(Illinois) 57 NE 2d 230; Atlantic Coast Line Railroad 
Company v. Shouse, (Florida) 91 South 90; 14 R.C.L. 
Section 58, page 799; State v. McKay (Missouri) 30 SW" 
2d 83; Equitable Life v. Green, (Kentucky) 83 SW 2d 
478; Southern Pacific Company v. Stevens, (NM) 298 
Pacific 661; Nonnamaker v. Kay County Gas Comparny, 
(Okla.) 253 Pacific 296; Alexion v. Nockas, (Wash.) 17 
P. 2d 911; .Jackson v. Farmers Union Livestock Com-
mission, (Missouri) 181 SW 2d 211; Richards v. Parks, 
(Tenn.) 93 SW 2d 639; Texas Employers Insurance As-
sociation v. Patterson, (Texas) 192 SW 2d 255; Slater v. 
United Fuel Gas Company (West Virginia) 27 SE 2d 436; 
Herstein v. Kemker, (Tenn.) 94 SW 2d 76 at page 88; 
Yellow Cab Co. v. Sanders, (N. Carolina) 27 SE 2d 631. 
Again there was evidence in this case on the part of 
the truck driver and his passenger to the effect that the 
truck pursued a straight course, and did not at any time 
turn one iota to the right to make more room for plaintiff 
at the narrow bridge. The defendant's duty to do so was 
emphasized by plaintiff's theory that defendant was en-
croaching upon plaintiff's side of the road at the narrow 
bridge. We therefore think that it was clearly error for 
the court to refuse to give Plaintiff's Requested Instruc-
tion No. 6 which was not otherwise covered by any in-
struction which the court gave. That instruction is as 
follows: 
You are hereby instructed that if you shall 
find and believe from a preponderance of the evi-
dence that as the vehicles involved in this accident 
approached each other prior to the impact, the 
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plaintiff's Yehicle turned to avoid striking the 
bridge or the wash near the point of impact, and 
in so doing the plaintiff acted reasonably and 
exercised ordinary care under the circumstances, 
and if you shall further find that the defendant 
obserYed the plaintiff so alter the course of his 
automobile, or if you shall find that in the exercise 
of ordinary care the · defendant should have 
seen the plaintiff so alter the course of his auto-
mobile, and if you shall further find that the 
defendant had a reasonable opportunity thereafter 
in the exercise of ordinary care to avoid colliding 
with the plaintiff's automobile, by turning to the 
right without endangering the safety of the occu-
pants of defendant's truck, and if you shall find 
that the defendant failed to avail itself of such op-
portunity, but continued straight ahead on an un-
altered course, and that such conduct on the part 
of the defendant was the proximate cause of the 
accident, then you must find the issues in favor 
of the plaintiff and against the defendant, unless 
you shall also find that the plaintiff was guilty of 
contributory negligence. 
To the failure of the court to grant this requested instruc-
tion, the plaintiff duly excepted (R. 369). 
There is ample evidence in the record to support 
plaintiff's theory of the case as embodied in plaintiff's 
Requested Instruction No. 6. There was evidence that the 
defendant not only was encroaching upon plaintiff's side 
of the road at the narrow bridge, but also that the defend-
ant failed to move over, although he had plenty of room 
and opportunity to do so. 
That the court committed prejudicial error in refus-
ing to give plaintiff's Requested Instruction No. 3 and 
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plaintiff's Requested Instruction No. 6, is clearly estab-
lished by the foregoing authorities. 
Point III. The plaintiff was deprived of a fair and im-
partial trial by the improper admission of evidence 
that was calculated to inflame and confuse the jury, 
and stifle their minds with prejudice and hatred 
toward the plaintiff. 
The record discloses that plaintiff was suffering 
from a partial amnesia which disabled him from remem-
bering any of the events which transpired in Cedar City 
prior to the collision, as well as any events that occurred 
at the hospital at Cedar City (R. 61-62-63, 76-77). 
Dr. Milligan testifying on behalf of the plaintiff stat-
ed that plaintiff had sustained a concussion of the brain 
(R. 27), as a result of the blow on his temple which had 
been sutured. He stated that the blow to the head was 
moderately severe (R. 18). He also stated that an injury 
to the head can cause loss of memory for events im-
mediately preceding the accident, and that any degree of 
loss of memory is possible from a head injury; that the 
head injury could cause loss of memory over a certain 
period of time immediately preceding the injury except 
for things that may have made an extremely strong im-
pression (R. 21). The doctor further stated that it is 
probable that plaintiff could remember events which 
struck him forcefully, and would not remember events 
that did not strike him forcefully; that shock could be of 
sufficient degree to erase minor impressions in the brain 
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and leaYe strong ones, or could be of sufficient severity 
to erase them all (R. 26). 
Over the objection of the plaintiff that the testi-
mony sought to be elicited was remote, the court per-
mitted the witness Jack Scott to testify concerning an 
incident, wherein the plaintiff addressed a Mr. Tuckett 
thusly: "Hi, Stupid" and made threatening gestures 
with a 22 rifle to the witness Tuckett. 
Again over the objection of plaintiff, Dr. L. V. Broad-
bent was permitted to give repetitious testimony about 
the very belligerent, obstreperous behavior of the plain-
tiff, and about his use of profane language (R. 297-298). 
Again over the objection of the plaintiff, the nurse, 
Phyllis Nelson was permitted to testify that the plain-
tiff was profane, belligerent and uncooperative in every 
way while he was being treated at the hospital after the 
accident (R. 353). Again the witness was permitted to 
state: 
A. Well, he didn't appreciate what was being 
done for him, and he was using abusive langu-
age and it was hard for us to handle him.'' 
Counsel for the plaintiff moved that this statement be 
stricken on the ground that it was repititious, and the 
court permitted the answer to stand (R. 354). 
It must be remembered in this connection that all the 
evidence paraded before the jury by the defendant as to 
the proceedings of the plaintiff in Cedar City prior to the 
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time of the accident and, subsequently in the hospital 
where he was undergoing treatment, was not, and could 
not have been, disputed by the plaintiff by reason of his 
loss of memory due to the blow on his head. The evidence 
that plaintiff made threatening gestures, for instance, 
with his gun to the alarm of the witnesses Tucket and Jack 
Scott was not offered for the purpose of showing that he 
was intoxicated, as Scott had already described his be-
havior at some length prior to that time, but such evi-
dence was presented to the jury for the sole purpose of 
inflaming their minds against the plaintiff. Again 
testimony was elicited from the doctor and the nurse 
while the plaintiff was being treated in the hospital, rela-
tive to his profaning and belligerency some two hours 
after the accident had occurred, not for the purpose of 
showing that the plaintiff was intoxicated, but for the 
purpose of arousing the prejudice and hatred of the jury. 
Considering the condition of the plaintiff in the hospital 
with his arm hanging by a ribbon of muscle, a gash in his 
temple, his l;>ody almost completely exsanguinated, his 
right leg in a condition of rigor mortis and the patient 
loaded with sedatives and on the verge of death, consider-
ing that he was finally brought to the hospital after 
spending an hour to an hour and a half without medical 
attention on the side of the road, within 7 miles of a town, 
certainly, the plaintiff was entitled to be irritable. We 
think it was going a long way for the court to permit the 
matter of his profaning and his belligerency to be sub-
mitted to the jury, on the pretense that such showed in-
toxication, particularly after the doctor had testified that 
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his behaYior could be attributed to the severity of his 
injuries and his c-ondition of shock, and particularly after 
the doctor had acknowledged that he had previously testi-
fied under oath that he could not say that the plaintiff 
was intoxicated. "\Ve do not perceive in what manner the 
threatening of a couple of businessmen in Cedar City 
with a gun, if such thing actually did happen, at 5:30 in 
the evening, could have any probative value to assist the 
jury in determining whether the defendant's truck en-
croached upon the plaintiff's side of the road at the nar-
row bridge at 10:00 o'clock in the evening; nor can we 
perceive how the matter of his profaning in the Cedar 
City Hospital some two hours after the collision could 
throw any light upon the issues which the jury were 
called upon to determine. The conclusion is therefore in-
escapable that this testimony was calculated to arouse the 
passion and hatred of the jury toward the plaintiff and to 
render him despicable in their minds. 
It is stated in 31 Corpus Juris Secondum, Page 877, 
Section 166 that evidence which tends to prove facts which 
are admitted or are not controverted will be more readily 
excluded where if admitted it would probably prejudice 
and mislead the jury. 
Again in the case of Floyd v. Federal Union Casualty 
Company, (Texas) 39 SW 2d 1091 at Page 1093 appears 
the following: 
"The fact of his leaving and the alleged cause 
thereof was not evidence, and it would have been 
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improper to have injected into the case sordid de-
tails to distract the attention of the jury which 
should be concentrated on vital points and could 
only have the effect of wasting the time of the 
court. The court should refuse to permit its intro-
duction, particularly when the testimony which is 
challenged as irrelevant is such as to arouse the 
sympathy of the jurors, or is calculated to create 
prejudice-the point sought to be proved having 
already been established-and is offered as being 
merely corroborative. Stallings v. Rullman 79 
(Texas) 421 15 SW 677 ; 2 Jones On Evidence, 
Second Edition, Sec. 588, 22 Corpus Juris 169.'' 
In the case at bar the plaintiff was entitled to have the 
jury pass upon matters which related to the incidents 
which occurred at the narrow bridge on the Buckhorn 
Flat at the time of the collision. The court should not 
have permitted the juror's minds to be cluttered up, con-
fused and corroded by the events related by the witness 
Jack Scott and by the alleged profanity which occurred 
in the hospital. To borrow the thought of Mr. Justice 
Straup expressed in the Johnson case, supra, we should 
not consider any kind of a trial good enough for 
plaintiff, just because he had the odor- of liquor on his 
breath. 
Point IV. The court erred in fa.iling to grant Plain-
tiff's motion for a new trial. 
That the court erred in denying plaintiff's motion 
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CONCLUSION 
We respectfully and earnestly conclude that by rea-
son of matters set forth in this brief the plaintiff was de-
prived of a fair trial, and the judgment of the lower court 
should be reversed. 
WOODROW D. WHITE, 
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